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DIVERGENT STRATEGIES: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
WTO’S NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY, 1983-2019
By: William J. Gardner, Jr. *
ABSTRACT
This student note provides a legal history of the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) adjudication of “national security” disputes under
Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
skeptical German historian Oswald Spengler noted, “History is direction—
but Nature is extension—ergo everyone gets eaten by a bear.” Tracing the
history of landmark GATT and WTO decisions from the 1983 US—Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua case, this note weaves through the WTO’s
relatively consistent reluctance to engage in domestic policy, detailing the
WTO’s massive deviation from that policy in the 2019 Russia—Measures
Concerning Traffic in Transit case. In doing so, this note presents a
comprehensive history of the GATT and the WTO, while describing the
fundamental themes of conflict presented throughout the WTO’s relatively
short history, especially in the context of the national security exception.
Those themes, namely the so-called “shock of the global” and globalization,
and the WTO’s struggle to reconcile domestic and international interests,
permeate throughout the history of the GATT and the WTO. In effect, this
paper details the WTO’s challenges with national security and domestic
affairs, which some speculate might lead to a self-cannibalization of the WTO,
especially should the United States elect to leave the organization within the
next year.
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“History is direction—but Nature is extension—ergo everyone gets
eaten by a bear.”
-Oswald Spengler
“The nation will continue to be a central pole of identification, even if
more and more nations come to share common economic and
political forms of organization.”
-Francis Fukayama
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INTRODUCTION

In 2019, thirty-six years of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) Appellate Body’s jurisprudence evaporated with the stroke
of a pen. From 1983-2019, the WTO Appellate Body recognized
national sovereignty as a principal beyond its reach; Wilsonian selfdetermination guided Appellate Body decisions such that nationalistic
security
considerations
counter-balanced—and
arguably
outweighed—standard tariff considerations. 1 The lingering specter of
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provided,
in Article XXI, an “exception” to the WTO’s otherwise globalized
interest. The following provision, Article XXI, embodied the essence of
early twentieth century views on self-determination; by 2019, it
became clear that Wilsonian self-determination seemed incompatible
with larger, globalized marketplaces, which require free trade—with
few to no nationalistic tariffs—in order to operate properly. 2
Article XXI
Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a)
to require any contracting party to furnish any
information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to its essential security interests; or
See Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Fourteen Points
Address) (1918), in 45 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 534, 539 (Arthur S. Link
ed., 1984). For the sake of simplicity, the references to Wilsonian self-determination
serve as a guiding instrument to explain the GATT 1947’s interests: ensuring that
supranational trade not interfere with otherwise strictly national interests. “Wilsonian
self-determination” refers to the President’s plea for nationalistic autocracy in the
international system, highlighted in the Fourteen Points speech. Id.; see also Report
by the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 5.1-.17, L/6053
(Oct. 13, 1986), http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.pdf
[hereinafter Nicaragua Panel Report].
2
See Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
697 (2011). Though Alford’s work focuses more on the self-judging nature of the
national security exception, he contextualizes the conflict between supra-national and
national intentions—a key theme in the comparison of the national security exception
to Wilsonian self-determination drawn by this paper. It is also logical to attribute the
national security exception to Wilsonian idealisms, being that early trade views were
formed by post-World War I era international skepticism.
1
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(b)
to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests
(i)
relating to fissionable materials or the
materials from which they are derived;
(ii)
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii)
taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or
(c)
to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action in pursuance of its obligations under the
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security. 3
Of note—and quite unique to Article XXI—is that the national
security exception applies to situations wherein the contracting party
has the right to judge its own essential security interests. 4 Noting the
vague definition of “security interests,” it is important to again
contextualize this exemption as quite contrary to international
comity. 5 Though the national security exception is a clear attempt to
balance international trade with domestic considerations, many fear
the ambiguity surrounding Article XXI’s language allows countries to
essentially “opt-out” of international free trade agreements for the
sake of national security. 6

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant
Failure?, 52 DUKE L. J. 1277, 1278 (2003).
3
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THE ORIGINS OF THE WTO NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCEPTION, ITS PROBLEMS, AND THE CRISIS OF THE
PRESENT DAY

Article XXI ensured each nation certain “national security”
rights, wherein the WTO could not act “to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests.” 7 In effect, GATT 1947
limited the WTO’s global mission from the outset—in theory, nations
could circumvent Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) trade principles by
claiming breach of their national security interests, thereby placing
tariffs as they pleased and not necessarily to the benefit of the
international community.
However, the WTO’s history seems to suggest such a fatal flaw
ought not otherwise exist. In 1944, the Allied powers, meeting at the
Bretton Woods Conference, crafted the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and GATT 1947. 8 Spearheaded by the United States,
which moved away from its historically isolationist policies because it
could now afford freer trade, GATT 1947 culminated in eight rounds,
each of which attempted to reduce tariff levels and increase trade
between nations. 9 GATT 1947 and its architects recognized a strikingly
modern trade theory—Less Developed Countries (“LDCs”) required
trade, and the United States’ goal of “communist containment” would
only be furthered if democracy, industrialization, and prosperity took
hold in these countries. 10
After eight successful rounds, in 1994, the Uruguay Round
culminated in the creation of the WTO under the guise of GATT 1994. 11
Importantly, GATT 1994 incorporates the entirety of GATT 1947, but
provisions the creation of the WTO under these former Bretton Woods

GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI(b).
WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL, US TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 4
(2d ed. 2004).
9
Id.
10
See generally X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566-582 (1947);
see also Lovett, supra note 8, at 4.
11
Lovett, supra note 8, at 10.
7
8
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principles. 12 The GATT Secretariat expanded from a rounds-based
regime to a continuing multinational organization. 13 Voting in the
WTO shifted toward simple majority, with each country receiving one
vote, as in the United Nations General Assembly. 14 In addition, GATT
1994 created the WTO dispute settlement panel system, whereby
countries that feel disfavored can counter tariff processes they feel are
contrary to their interests by convening a panel to challenge the
tariffs. 15 Importantly, however, decisions upheld by the WTO’s
Appellate Body—a seven-member “court”—cannot be overturned
except by a negative consensus; that is, all countries that win would
have to support their victory being overturned in such a system. 16
Therefore, as no rational actor would support the reversal of a decision
in their favor, WTO panel decisions are all but impossible to overturn.
Having dispensed with the relevant background, this Note
traces the legal history of the WTO national security exception,
beginning with the 1983 United States—Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua case and ending with the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic
in Transit case, noting the massive impacts on the disparate results
between these two cases on pending dispute settlements. It will
elucidate on four main themes: (1) the “shock of the global” and
reconciling national interests with the globalized system of trade; (2)
the recurrence of the idea that the WTO is full of incongruous goals,
most importantly, reconciling national security exceptions with comity
in international trade; (3) the WTO’s failure to determine whether the
national security exception is “self-judging”; and (4) the drastic shift
from 1983 to now as part of a larger history of globalization, focusing
on this context as shaping the development of international trade law.
This Note is an intellectual history. It will consider the now
uncertain future created by the four aforementioned thematic
undertones in the broader context of WTO dispute settlement issues
promulgated by the national security exception to GATT 1947.
12
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
13
Lovett, supra note 8, at 10.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 10-11.
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Importantly, one such example of looming uncertainty in WTO
jurisprudence exists in the Qatar and UAE dispute over “measures
taken in the context of coercive attempts at economic isolation”
allegedly imposed by the UAE upon Qatar. 17 Most drastic, however,
are the implications for Section 232 tariffs imposed by the United
States. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 enables U.S.
Presidents to unilaterally install tariffs under the guise of a domestic
national security exception, mirroring Article XXI of GATT 1947. 18
Though Section 232 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were created
for the Kennedy Round, wherein the United States slashed tariffs by
roughly fifty percent, the legislation cuts both ways, allowing drastic
restrictions of trade with little oversight. Due to President Trump
installing tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles under Section
232, eight countries, as well as the European Union, have initiated
WTO dispute resolution panels against the United States: China, India,
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. 19 As a
result, now, more than ever, the clouded and muddled jurisprudence
of the WTO regarding GATT’s Article XXI and the national security
exception is vital to the interests of the global community.
Much of the existing scholarship on the legal history of the
United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua case and the Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case eschews notions of a
continuing legal history in favor of discrete analyses. Simon Lester and
Huan Zhu’s A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National Security”
Trade Restrictions notes the US-Nicaragua case and its place in a broader
history, but does not describe that history, instead focusing on an
See Tania Voon, The Security Exception in WTO Law: Entering into a New Era,
113 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 46 (2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aopcambridge-core/content/view/CF8C3DCDF2CD924CAEEDD147840668F9/S23987
72319000035a.pdf/security_exception_in_wto_law_entering_a_new_era.pdf; WTO,
Qatar Seeks WTO Panel Review of UAE Measures on Goods, Services, IP Rights,
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dsb_23oct17_e.htm.
18
Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44707, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS AND DUTIES 1 (2016).
19
See Voon, supra note 17, at 47. For further information regarding the domestic
implications of President Trump’s actions, which will not be the focus of this note,
see Joshua Jamerson, Congress Mulls Curbing Presidential Trade Authority, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-mullscurbing-presidential-trade-authority-11550152801.
17
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active proposal for the re-shaping of US domestic policy in light of the
2019 Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit decision. 20 Roger P.
Alford provided perhaps the most comprehensive legal history of the
WTO’s national security exception, however, his article The SelfJudging WTO National Security Exception is now dated, originating in
2011; yet, it remains one of the most complete and impressive legal
histories on the pre-2019 status quo ante of the WTO and GATT Article
XXI decisions. 21 In Petrificus Totalus: The Spell of National Security!, R. V.
Anuradha provides a complete list of the historical and contemporary
national security dispute cases facing the WTO. 22 Interestingly,
Anuradha’s documentation of these cases eschews historical analysis
for a broader study of the national security exception itself; instead of
explaining the contemporary issues regarding the ongoing trade wars,
it contextualizes the GATT’s development over time. 23 In National
Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision or Reconciliation?, J.
Benton Heath, provides a thematic account of the collision between
international and national trade policies, particularly in the history of
GATT Article XXI. 24 Yet, Heath’s paper is not a history like this note;
it is a thematic overview, describing the tensions between the national
and the international, but not discussing and detailing the mechanisms
and context in play throughout the thirty-six year history of GATT
Article XXI. 25 The literature on the legal history of the WTO’s decisions
from the 1983 US-Nicaragua dispute to the 2019 Russia-Ukraine dispute
insufficiently describes these events, claiming them to be separate and
distinct, rather than, as this student note argues, part of a larger
continuum.
The final—and integral—theme of this paper is the cyclical
nature of the underlying legal history, such that the WTO seems to be
moving away from the toleration of “isolationist” policies such as the
Article XXI national security exception and toward a global,
Simon Lester and Huan Zhu, A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National
Security” Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451 (2019).
21
Alford, supra note 2.
22
R. V. Anuradha, Petrificus Totalus: The Spell of National Security!, 13 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 311 (2018).
23
Id.
24
J. Benton Heath, National Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision
or Reconciliation?, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1431 (2019).
25
Id.
20
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internationalized, and modern system of free trade based on
international comity. Interestingly, this system seemed present at the
time of the GATT’s inception, yet yielded to international skepticism,
an operational guideline for most trading countries during the preWorld War I era. 26
III.

GATT—FOUNDING A NEW WORLD, 1947

As GATT grew out of the Bretton Woods framework and
evolved into a mature international organization, its members met in
a series of “rounds,” each designed to further international comity in
commerce and trade. GATT concluded a series of eight rounds, not
counting the initial round in Geneva: Annecy, Torquay, Geneva II,
Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay, and Doha. Though some of the
early rounds—namely the Annecy and Torquay rounds—proceeded
with the intention of establishing GATT as an international governing
body, as well as developing GATT’s institutional framework, each of
the eight rounds shared one commonality: tariff reduction. 27
Importantly, GATT’s designers intended its use for trade
liberalization and freedom, not protectionism and isolation. Though
provisions such as the aforementioned Article XXI national security
exception existed at the time of GATT’s adoption, the main intention
of GATT was the systematic lowering—and eventual erasure—of
international tariffs. 28 In its preamble, GATT recognized that reforms
post-war had to favor market liberalization; GATT operated under the
presumption that higher living standards would ensue internationally
if market access increased while trade costs contemporaneously
decreased. 29
Market liberalization starkly contrasted with pre-World War I
attitudes, which favored nationalistic market independence and heavy
tariffs in order to support domestic economies and production. Two
SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY, THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR 4 (photo. reprt. 1948)
(2nd ed.).
27
See Timeline: World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2430089.stm.
28
ANTHONY M. ENDRES & GRANT A. FLEMING, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1919-1950 131 (2002).
29
GATT, supra note 3, art. VII.
26
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economists’ ideas stand pronounced in early GATT liberalization
principles: the Swedish economist Folke Hilgerdt and the British
economist John Maynard Keynes.
Hilgerdt’s early work suggested freer trade in the 1930s would
have reduced the depth of the worldwide impact of the Great
Depression because it would have dampened inflation pressures in the
larger, relatively closed economies. 30 In other words, liberal trade
would have stymied the spread of the Great Depression’s disastrous
downturn because closed national markets would not have faced such
heavy inflation, due to the countervailing force of global, liberal
trade. 31 Modeling the aforementioned then-experimental liberal trade
network, in 1938, Hilgerdt demonstrated considerable trade
integration despite the rise of protectionism in the 1930s; also, his
models indicated the potential for greater multilateral trade, but only
if trade were substantially liberalized and tariffs accordingly
reduced. 32
Keynes’ famous works, including the General Theory, did not
hold sway in the early Geneva round of GATT. 33 Though neither the
early GATT rounds cited the General Theory, nor did they attribute their
ideas to Keynes in any official regard, a general “Keynesian” idea that
aggregate demand could be managed by monetary and fiscal policy
seemed to predominate. 34 By promoting microeconomic
liberalization—that is, liberalization of trade at the national scale—
through freer trade, GATT seemingly relied upon and employed the
ideas of Keynes’ work. 35 The Geneva round’s initial research program
derived much of its ideals from Scandinavian-style international
economics, which ultimately proved pivotal in the installment of this
Keynesian-esque system. 36 Clearly, the then-liberal ideas of free trade
pronounced by Hilgerdt, Keynes, and their contemporaries

Endres & Fleming, supra note 28, at 131.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.; see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY, 1936.
34
Endres & Fleming, supra note 28, at 132.
35
Id.
36
Id.
30
31
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manifested in the GATT, whether or not the 1947 agreement explicitly
attributed its ideals to their works.
A. The Subcutaneous Emergence of the WTO, 1994
After nearly fifty years of successful trade liberalization
measures, GATT folded into a permanent international body—the
WTO. By “the early 1980s, the United States suggested a broader
GATT round to include services and agriculture, and to open more
NIC [‘Newly Industrialized Country’] and LDC [‘Less Developed
Country’] markets.” 37 Countervailing forces—namely in the form of
rising protectionist interests—threatened international comity in
trade; a “consensus” of sorts soon emerged—a broad Uruguay GATT
round was necessary to combat a potential bifurcation in the fragile
international system established in 1947. 38 However, another threat to
the international system emerged, placing the Uruguay round’s
ambitions in doubt. The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev,
sought perestroika and glasnost, effectively reforming the country, and
opening its manufacturing capacities to widespread international
trade. The EU, in the meanwhile, resisted international liberalization
of agricultural trade. 39 Finally, Americans felt—likely due to the
aforementioned pressures on the GATT system—a “more level
playing field was essential.” 40
These potentially bifurcating tensions resolved with the
creation of the WTO. An international body providing equal votes and
a dispute resolutions process based on the same goals as GATT 1947,
the WTO seemed poised to cure the ailing GATT system. 41 The United
States viewed these aforementioned features, particularly the
equitable voting system, as highly controversial. 42 Like the United
Nations, each member country of the WTO would receive one vote,
with all votes weighed equally among the member states. 43 In effect,
Lovett, supra note 8, at 8-11.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Lovett, supra note 8, at 8-11.
43
Id.
37
38
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developing countries possess some three-quarters of the votes in the
WTO. Compared with the International Monetary Fund, which has
weighted voting according to financial quotas and economic strength,
the WTO provided an arguably less-than-ideal voting system for
satisfying the GATT’s purposes of a level playing field. 44
Most controversial to the United States and other founding
members, however, was the WTO’s Appellate Body system. 45 Panel
decisions are appealable to the Appellate Body, a seven-member court,
for the purposes of review. 46 However, Appellate Body decisions
cannot be overturned except by the unanimous vote of all WTO
member states. 47 From a matter of practicality, any nation that has won
an appeal in their favor after appearing before the Appellate Body has
no logical reason to then cast a vote to overturn the favorable decision.
Effectively, the negative consensus requirement means that WTO
Appellate Body decisions are nearly de facto and cannot be
overturned. 48
Importantly, though the WTO provides access to dispute
resolution panels, its appeals process is relatively limited. As such,
decisions of the WTO Appellate Body can reshape interpretations of
GATT 1947, without room for further appeal. The powerful
precedential-overriding power of the Appellate Body ensures
decisions once understood as the final manifestation of GATT’s
national security exception, for example the holding in the US—
Nicaragua dispute, can be summarily overturned years later, as was the
case in the Russia—Ukraine decision.
IV.

US—NICARAGUA: THE PRECARIOUS ORIGINS OF A
“SELF-JUDGING” ARTICLE XXI NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCEPTION

On May 1, 1985, then-President Ronald Reagan issued
Executive Order 12513 prohibiting the majority of trade with
Nicaragua and restricting all transactions related to certain forms of air
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
46
Id. at 11.
47
Lovett, supra note 8, at 11.
48
See id.
44
45
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and sea transportation between Nicaragua and the United States. 49
Nicaragua, dissatisfied with President Reagan’s actions, called for
panel review by the GATT with the intent of examining the measures
imposed by the United States in light of Article XXI. 50 The United
States subsequently rejected to the establishment of a panel, citing
GATT Article XXI as justification for the sanctions. The United States’
national security interests, according to the United States
representative, fell within the domain of domestic governance, not the
GATT’s Council. 51 “A panel could [] not address the validity of, nor
the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of Article XXI.” 52 The
United States additionally noted the futility of Nicaragua’s qualm,
noting any panel recommendation made would inherently rely upon
a limited frame of reference—United States and Nicaragua-centric
domestic law—and therefore could not apply on a broader scale. 53
The Nicaraguan theory of Article XXI’s application relied on
two distinct conditions: (1) the measures taken by the United States—
or any other Article XXI action taken by another power—had to be
necessary for the protection of an essential security interest; and (2) the
measure had to be taken in a time of war or other emergency in
international relations. 54 In effect, Nicaragua advocated that Article
XXI should be interpreted as a self-defense law; that is, in order for one
power to effectuate national security tariffs, they would have to be
attacked or otherwise somehow have their national security impacted
by some other nation.
Interestingly, the Panel had little discussion regarding the
purposes of the United States and its counter-arguments; contextual
analysis provides that the United States perhaps was arguing Article
XXI’s national security was an assurance of a sovereign right, outside
the realm of any international body. Historian Geoffrey Blainey, in The
Causes of War, notes that international prosperity is not always an
effective deterrent to war. 55 Using World War I as a case study, Blainey
Exec. Order No. 12513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1985).
Nicaragua Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 8.
55
See generally GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR (1973).
49
50
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describes the failure of peace despite increasing trade, tourism, and
growing global multiculturalism. 56 In a similar vein, the United States
responded to the aforementioned Nicaraguan assertion regarding
Article XXI with a dismissive indifference, stating that “Article XXI
applied to any action which the contracting party taking it considered
necessary for the protection of its essential security interest.” 57
Similarly to the thesis in Blainey’s work, the United States argued
Article XXI inherently could not be for war deterrent purposes.
Though the Nicaraguan government claimed that war could be
deterred through the functioning of the GATT—by increasing trade
and trade access—the United States supposed through its argument
that the GATT functioned less for the purposes of peace and more for
the purposes of financial growth.
Despite American protestations, in a separate review of the
issues at bar, the International Court of Justice found that embargoing
Nicaragua was one of a series of economic and military actions taken
against Nicaragua in violation of international law. 58 The GATT
Council noted the International Court of Justice’s holding that the
embargoes were not necessary for the protection of any essential
security interest of the United States. 59 The United States replied to the
International Court of Justice and the panel with a simple argument—
Article XXI applied to “any action which the contracting party taking
it considered necessary for the protection of its essential security
interest.” 60 Using direct language from the GATT 1947, the United
States highlighted an inherently self-interested application of the law:
the national security exception applied in situations where a country
was acting in order to protect its own national security. In other words,
the best judge of a nation’s national security, then, was that nation
itself.
Adjudicating this dispute, the GATT Council relied upon the
following limited terms of reference:

56

Id.
Nicaragua Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7.
58
Id. at 1.
59
Id. at 8.
60
GATT, supra note 3.
57
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To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT
provisions, of the understanding reached at the
Council on 10 October 1985 that the Panel cannot
examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the
invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii)[sic] by the United
States, of the relevant provisions of the Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/211-218), and
of the agreed Dispute Settlement Procedures contained
in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration (BISD29S/13-16),
the measures taken by the United States on 7 May 1985
and their trade effects in order to establish to what
extent benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the
General Agreement have been nullified or impaired,
and to make such findings as will assist the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in further action in this
matter. 61
The Panel report made clear that “the Panel could not examine
the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of
Article XXI.” 62 The aforementioned terms of reference explicitly state
the Panel “cannot examine or judge the validity of or motivation for
the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii)[sic].” 63 Prematurely having its legs
swept from below, the Panel therefore could not actually reach a ruling
on the Article XXI invocation. As some measure of guidance, in dicta,
the Panel “concluded that embargoes such as the one imposed by the
United States, independent of whether or not they were justified under
Article XXI, ran counter to basic aims of the GATT . . . .” 64 However,
the Panel’s ultimate conclusion seemingly left Article XXI matters in
the hands of sovereign nations for them to articulate and manage,
whether or not such actions were actually valid under Article XXI.
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“Freedom is Under Siege”—Contextualization and
Explanation of the United States’ Argument Before
the GATT Council Under President Reagan

President Reagan, in his 1985 State of the Union address, laid
the ground for the aforementioned executive order that the
Nicaraguan government protested before the GATT Council and, in
doing so, created the so-called “Reagan Doctrine.” 65 President Reagan
stated “[w]e cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not
innocent; nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege . . .
Support for freedom fighters is self-defense . . . It is essential that the
Congress continue all facets of our assistance to Central America.” 66
Later that May, the President signed the fateful and above-mentioned
Executive Order 12513; an estimated $169 million in bilateral trade
evaporated with the stroke of a pen, justified by supposed threats to
the United States’ national security. 67
At discussion before the GATT Council, nineteen of the fortythree nations present argued that Article XXI was self-judging; nine
argued that it was not; and fifteen expressed no opinion. 68 A clear
majority of the Member states felt, then, that national security interests
lay in the hands of each nation individually; that the GATT could not
intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign powers; and that, with
regards to maintaining international comity in trade, GATT’s powers
should be strictly limited to the supra-national. Nicaragua poignantly
argued strongly against a self-judging Article XXI, suggesting the
absurdity of claiming that “Nicaragua, a small and undeveloped
country, could pose a threat to the national security of one of the most
powerful countries in the world.” 69 India, agreeing, suggested need for
proving a “genuine nexus” between security interests and “trade
action taken.” 70 Cuba added “it was a mockery . . . for such a powerful
country to cite Article XXI as a basis for imposing economic sanctions
Alford, supra note 2, at 713.
President Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Feb. 6, 1985).
67
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on a small, poor country that could not possibly threaten U.S.
security.” 71 Poland and Czechoslovakia joined the Nicaraguan side,
addressing fears over power imbalances and pointing out that Article
XXI could easily be invoked by stronger powers to essentially impose
upon smaller countries “discriminatory, unilateral and arbitrary
actions.” 72 In other words, a self-judging national security interest is
structured such that justifications are not required. The actions of the
United States—a major hegemon—in claiming that a significantly
smaller and weaker Nicaragua posed a threat to American national
security demonstrated to Nicaragua, India, Cuba, and their other six
fellow Member states a clear hypocrisy lying dormant in the GATT
system.
By the end of Nicaragua’s plea for review, the GATT Council
found for the United States, affirming the idea that Article XXI was, in
effect, self-judging. Harkening back to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the
GATT Council recognized national sovereignty and the right to selfgovernance, but at a cost. The only extant international body of trade
failed to plug a major hole in its system. Until 2019, the United States—
Nicaragua conflict remained binding, such that even after the formation
of the WTO, Article XXI actions proceeded with an emphasis on
domestic non-intervention. 73
V.

THE PRESENT DAY: RUSSIA-MEASURES CONCERNING
TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT
A.

The Russia-Ukraine Dispute in Context

Much of the world has been watching the Russian military
intervention in Ukraine with a keen eye. Since February 2014, Russian
military forces have occupied—and effectively annexed—parts of the
Ukrainian peninsula, including Crimea. 74 In what has effectively been
71
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a localized and miniaturized war, the Ukrainian government has
attempted to reclaim the Crimea; throughout the Spring of 2014,
Russian troops invaded the region, seizing key facilities, attempting to
reclaim the Crimea as part of Russia. 75 The Russian government—
under the direction of Vladimir Putin—initially denied that the
soldiers wearing Russian combat fatigues, utilizing Russian
weaponry, and equipped with Russian tactical equipment were at all
committing actions sanctioned by the Russian government. 76 That is
until April of 2014, when President Putin confirmed the troops were
indeed Russian, committing actions sanctioned by the Russian
government. 77 In a highly controversial election, the Crimean
government—essentially a puppet controlled by the Russian regime—
voted “Soviet-style” to join Russia; a 97% “yes” vote with 83% turnout
forever changed Ukraine’s governance in the twenty-first century. 78
Reasons for the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent
military occupation of eastern Ukraine are historical and myriad.
Catherine the Great annexed the region in 1783, where it remained
under Russian—and subsequently Soviet—control until 1954, when it
was transferred to the Soviet Bloc-run Ukrainian government. 79 Even
still, Russian motives for intervening and interfering with the
autonomous post-Soviet Ukraine seem to echo the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Espoused in 1968, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev declared the
need for the then-Soviet Union to intervene in the then-Soviet Bloc
states, in order to maintain a Marxist-Leninist status quo. 80 Effectively,
then, the Soviet government announced its right to intervene militarily
in any Eastern Bloc nation it felt necessary. In the twenty-first century,
Vladimir Putin has espoused much the same, justifying his actions as
necessary to protect “ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the
region.” 81
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Russia—Ukraine: The Economic Crisis and the
Entrance of the WTO

At a surface level, in contrast to the United States and
Nicaragua, the Russia—Ukraine dispute hinges more-so on hard
military power than economic sanctions. While the United States was
actively engaged in the Falklands War, as well as the Iran-Contra
affair, its hard power presence in the contested region pales in
comparison to the literal boots-on-the-ground insurgency serving as
the background to the Russia—Ukraine dispute.
Russia imposed transit restrictions on Ukrainian territory in
January 2016, cutting off access to Central Asian and Caucasian
markets. 82 Under normal circumstances, access to these markets are
provided by means of Russian roadways and rail systems. 83 Ukraine,
economically impacted by these actions (for clear reasons, given that
major markets evaporated overnight due to the ongoing Russian
insurgency), petitioned the WTO, stating that “the Russian Federation
. . . adopted and applied various [damaging] measures concerning
traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine . . . through the territory
of the Russian Federation to third countries by means of road and rail
transportation.” 84 Russia’s answer and defense to the complaint was
simple: Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1947 states economic
restrictions “taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations” justified their implementation of constraints on Ukrainian
exports. 85 Again, the WTO faced a potential calamity. The age-old
question of national sovereignty and the WTO’s level of review of such
matters stood before the WTO—a specter of the past, haunting the
present, and threatening to disrupt order.
Before proceeding further in the discussion of the Russia—
Ukraine crisis, it is important to digress and mention that Russia and
Ukraine are, as aforementioned, technically at war. Historians, policy
strategists, and scholars alike have interchangeably used the term
“Russo—Ukrainian War” to describe Russo—Ukrainian relations
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since 2014. 86 Therefore, by all measures of technical accuracy and
precision, it is not incorrect for the Russian Federation to state that it is
at war with Ukraine and, because of that war, subsection (b)(iii) of
Article XXI of the GATT 1947 ensures Russia the right to unilaterally
cease trade and implement restrictions on the basis of national
security. 87 The United States, acting as a third-party, submitted a letter
addressed to the Panel. 88 In that letter, the United States agreed with
Russia, arguing that the WTO Panel ought to limit its frame of
reference to the strict verbiage of the GATT and recognize—from a
textualist standard—that Article XXI has been invoked. 89 The
European Union submitted a letter itself, also acting as a third-party. 90
In contrast to the United States, the European Union argued that
Article XXI invocations are justiciable; that is, Article XXI’s scope can
be determined—and therefore limited or expanded—by the WTO
Panel. 91
As to the United States’ position in its letter, there is one major
factor driving the United States’ continued defense of Article XXI.
Aside from the United States’ history with the 1983 Nicaragua
decision, the United States currently faces numerous disputes—each
Joshua P. Mulford, Non-State Actors in the Russo-Ukrainian War, 15 CONNECTIONS
89 (2016). See also Nick Thompson, Ukraine: Everything you need to know about
how we got here, CNN (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/10/europe/
ukraine-war-how-we-got-here/index.html; TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO
UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA 197 (2018).
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to demonstrate that, by the superficial verbiage of the GATT 1947, Russia can
effectuate tariffs and other such restrictions on trade. Article XXI of the GATT
provides extremely wide—essentially unlimited—discretion to a nation to protect its
own economic interests in the name of national security. For more reading on the
broad, nearly unlimited powers that GATT grants member states, see Anuradha, supra
note 22, at 1-7; Alford, supra note 2. See also GATT, supra note 3, for the language
in question, noting subsection 3, which states the GATT Council—now WTO, as
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essential security interests.”
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brought before the WTO, and all in reference to Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 Tariffs function as a domestic
counterpart to Article XXI, in that they allow the President of the
United States to impose “national security” tariffs in times where the
security of the nation is threatened. 92 Rather unsurprisingly, the
vagueness of Section 232—just like the vagueness of Article XXI—has
proven problematic, providing myriad issues to the United States
government and the world economy. 93 Section 232 tariffs have not
been used by any president after the 1995 creation of the WTO and
prior to President Trump. President Trump, however, has utilized
them liberally in his escalating trade war with China; the United States
has put Section 232 tariffs on aluminum, steel, and uranium, in return,
China, Russia, Turkey, and other nations impacted by the tariffs
brought their grievances to the WTO. 94 As such, the United States has
maintained its historical position that invoking Article XXI is a “selfjudging” action—as it set forth in the 1983 Nicaragua dispute—and
thus the United States forwarded the aforementioned letter to the
WTO, siding with Russia and suggesting the self-judging nature of
Article XXI actions. 95
C.

Zero Hour: The WTO Panel’s Decision

In a drastic shift from the proceeding seventy-two years of
international economic decision-making under the GATT 1947, the
WTO Panel found that the WTO “has jurisdiction to determine
whether the requirements of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 are
satisfied,” upon any invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii). 96 The panel
Joshua Jamerson, Congress Mulls Curbing Presidential Trade Authority, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-mullscurbing-presidential-trade-authority-11550152801.
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operated under terms of reference far different from those of the 1983
GATT Council for the United States—Nicaragua dispute:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of
the covered agreements cited by the parties to the
dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Ukraine in
document WT/DS512/3 and to make such findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or
in giving the rulings provided for in those
agreements. 97
These terms are far broader than the aforementioned limited
terms used in the 1983 Nicaragua dispute. 98 By a simple, superficial
comparison, it is clear that the panel here intended to act broadly, as it
decided to “make such findings as will assist the DSB . . . .” 99 However,
in the United States—Nicaragua case, the panel intended to act with
restraint, as its references explicitly omitted any discussion regarding
Article XXI, stating, “that the Panel cannot examine or judge the
validity of or motivation for the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii) by the
United States.” 100
Regarding the requirements for invoking Article XXI, the
Panel found “Russia has met the requirements for invoking Article
XXI(b)(iii) in relation to the measures at issue.” 101 However, the Panel’s
conclusion is not the end-all, be-all for this case, nor for international
relations and trade writ large. The Panel felt justified in upholding
Russia’s Article XXI invocation because the “relations between
Ukraine and Russia had deteriorated to such a degree that they were a
matter of concern to the international community.” 102 The Panel’s
decision yields speculation that the United States might attack the
strict definition of “war” and “emergency in international relations”
under the GATT; it is important to stress that in this Russia case the
WTO reached a conclusion antithetical to its extant history (including
Id. at 19.
See Nicaragua Panel Report, supra note 1, for comparison.
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history of Article XXI actions under the GATT). 103 Speculation is
abound that the United States might now contest the panel’s finding,
“[w]ar refers to armed conflict.” 104 Reasons for such an attack rely
mostly upon the Nicaragua case, again, as the United States there was
able to take Article XXI actions in a time when the United States
deemed its national security was at risk. By defining the term “war,”
the WTO has further limited the scope of Article XXI to legitimate
armed conflict; any attempt to bring Article XXI actions would
therefore require something like the Russia—Ukraine conflict, wherein
there are legitimate boots on the ground and an armed annexation has
occurred. Recalling the United States’ justification in the United
States—Nicaragua conflict, wherein the United States stated that
Nicaragua posed a threat to its national security with no further
explanation, such an explanation could not pass muster today, given
the Russia—Ukraine ruling’s constraints on Article XXI’s scope to
wartime actions.
Perhaps most confounding is that the WTO Panel’s decision
categorically excludes economically costly trade wars. 105 Given the
current state of international trade—with the aforementioned Section
232 tariffs causing much a stir—it is likely that this decision is reactive
to the global status quo. Note, however, that this decision by the Panel
will likely be appealed by Ukraine to the Appellate Body. Once there,
the Appellate Body will have the ability to review all restrictive trade
actions and state which ones it feels are justifiable under Article XXI
and which it feels are not justifiable. 106 As aforementioned, however,
no decision by the Appellate Body has ever been overturned, due to
the negative consensus requirement. That is not to say that the
Appellate Body will not overturn the Panel’s decision—it is currently
unknown at the time as to what the Appellate Body will do—but the
Appellate Body’s final review will likely not itself be overturned.
If the Appellate Body upholds the Panel’s findings, then it is
clear that Article XXI has effectively been amended, and that any
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amendment requires only one vote. 107 While perhaps hyperbolic, the
true issue is the continuing disagreements over national sovereignty
that have plagued GATT and the WTO since their inception.
Speculators and spectators alike believe that the United States is liable
to withdraw from the WTO given an Appellate Body decision
upholding the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit decision
that is then likely to be upheld by one Ukrainian vote (at the least). 108
The United States has historically demonstrated concern regarding
what it views as Appellate Body overreach; an aggressive stance by the
Trump Administration on foreign trade, coupled with long-brewing
discontent between the United States and the WTO means such a
withdrawal is very possible in the near future. 109
Fears of United States voters turning against the WTO as a
threat to national sovereignty and security have led to the theorization
that a United States withdrawal from the WTO could mean
permanent, immense tariff increases. 110 Ironically, the very system
designed to preserve and hierarchically manage international trade
seems to have created such immense backlash that the twentiethcentury free trade system is now in jeopardy. Any willingness of the
WTO Appellate Body “to rule on such a controversial topic risks
destabilizing the entire rules-based system of international trade,” as
one scholar has stated. 111 Surely, such an opinion is not an
107
See id. As aforementioned, the WTO has a negative consensus requirement for
Appellate Body review. Such a requirement therefore means that the Appellate Body’s
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exaggeration to state that the amendment process for GATT requires only one vote,
there is a case to be had that amendments are not really a general consensus decision;
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understatement given the magnitude of the Russia—Ukraine decision:
on one hand lies national sovereignty, the right to self-realization, and
Wilsonian self-determination of a sorts. On the other lies a system
inherently tied together by the WTO in order to promote international
comity, peace, and stability in trade and global economics.
D.

The Qatar—United Arab Emirates Conflict, and the
Future of International Trade Conflicts Arising Under
Article XXI

The aforementioned Section 232 disputes are myriad. China,
the European Union, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Turkey, Russia, India,
and Switzerland have thus far taken a number and entered the line of
complainants filing against the United States at the WTO. 112 These are
not the only claimants, but some of the larger countries airing their
grievances against the United States. An escalating trade war with
China, geopolitical posturing against Russia, uncertainty regarding
Turkey, and tenuous relations with Western Europe seem to have
escalated such that the WTO will have to review the United States’
Section 232 trade powers. As mentioned, these powers have existed—
and been used on-and-off—since the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was
passed; an even longer precedent of some fifty-eight years is in
question now.
Akin to the Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit
decision, another Panel review has been initiated regarding a conflict
between the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. 113 The dispute, similar
to Russia—Ukraine, centralizes around claims that Qatar has restricted
imports from the United Arab Emirates. 114 Since 2017, the United Arab
Emirates has boycotted Qatar over allegations of institutional and
governmental support for terrorism. 115 Qatar has denied the charge,
and the United Arab Emirates has claimed that Qatar’s response to the
United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds544_e.htm.
113
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boycott has been a ban on trade from the United Arab Emirates. 116
Qatar’s response has been to cite Article XXI of the GATT, suggesting
that threats to national security have justified its trade restrictions on
the United Arab Emirates. 117
The Qatar—United Arab Emirates situation is all too similar to
the Russia—Ukraine problem: tensions are brewing over trade, with
one larger country imposing trade restrictions on a smaller nation,
with justification for their actions coming from Article XXI of GATT.
As of August 2019, the United Arab Emirates agreed to drop its case
against Qatar, in response to Qatar’s easing of trade measures enacted
against the United Arab Emirates. 118 Importantly, this news comes
after—and likely as a result of—the Russia decision by the WTO.
Qatar’s reasons for easing tensions are unknown officially, but it is not
implausible to suggest that the changing tide of Article XXI decisions
has raised caution among WTO member states seeking to enact trade
restrictions. In the case of Qatar, it is again probable—but not known—
that the government, recognizing Russia’s pyrrhic victory in Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit acknowledged the polemic
written by the WTO against a broad Article XXI. Therefore,
understanding that its trade actions were likely no longer justifiable
under the WTO’s new regime, Qatar likely dropped its restrictions,
allowing the United Arab Emirates to thereafter drop its case.
VI.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Writing in the early twentieth century, Oswald Spengler stood
alone as a cynic among the optimistic attitude his compatriots shared
entering the new century. Perhaps only Jan Gotlib Bloch—whose nowfamous treatises on the harms of mechanized warfare and the decline
of international relations prior to the First World War—joins Spengler
in sharing such an attitude. Spengler, however, crafted a theory of
international relations and history characterized by an unnatural
cyclical-ism. Noting the tendency of humans to repeat their follies,
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Spengler assured his readers that the West was doomed and that the
new, ever-globalizing order he saw slowly growing out of the
Enlightenment was both dangerous and short-lived. 119
Others, including later historian Francis Fukayama, saw the
Enlightenment and the latter twentieth century—which Spengler did
not live to see—as instrumental in cementing the development of
liberal democracy and free market globalism as the de facto world
system, especially after the failures of Communism and Fascism. 120
Fukayama wrote famously that history had “ended” with the 1991
collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc; free trade, he felt, would
bring an era of prosperous, internationalized growth, while liberal
democracies would replace totalitarian regimes and autocratic
governance. 121
The truth lies somewhere in between the minds and ideas of
these writers. On one hand, the international system has developed
rapidly, with GATT evolving from a post-war solution to the
rebuilding of Europe and the rest of the war-ravaged world to
something of a permanent mainstay under the purview of the WTO.
On the other, Spengler’s perhaps overly reactionary stance was not
totally incorrect. The GATT’s 1947 recognition of national security as
an inherently domestic and self-judging standard meant that future
conflict would forever ensnare the GATT and its successors unless
such a conflict were to be resolved. An international system built on
hegemonized trade under the WTO cannot coexist with a domestically
oriented system, catering to the whims of each WTO member state’s
respective government.
The future, while uncertain, seems to be suggestive of a move
in two directions simultaneously—of an international body trying to
appease Spengler by focusing on the national and Fukayama by
focusing on the international. Such a situation is untenable. The
Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case is representative of
the culmination of thirty-six years of economic uncertainty; of a
reunion between the supra-national and the national. At best, the
future holds something of a middle ground—of a continued liberal
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trade network held together by the WTO, promoting comity in
international trade. At worst, the future presents a series of challenges
to the international order, and a heavy shift towards internalized,
domesticized governance and economics.

